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The Doctrine of
Judicial Ratification
By LEE LOEVINGER*

Two highly significant developments in antitrust law have
occurred during the past year. Both of these occurred on the
same day These two developments were the ratification by the
United States Supreme Court of section 1 of the Sherman Act
and of section 7 of the Clayton Act. Constitutional lawyers will
immediately recognize the significance of these developments.
Perhaps a brief word of explanation may be useful for others.
The power of the United States Supreme Court to declare a
statute unconstitutional was established m 1803 by the decision
m Marbury v Madison.' Nevertheless, for considerably more than
a century thereafter it was commonly assumed that a statute enacted by Congress and signed by the President was at least presumptively the law of the United States unless or until it was
properly challenged and adjudicated to be unconstitutional. However, in recent years the view has spread among substantial segments of the bar and the business community that a law which
is in any respect inconvenient, restrictive or controversial, does
not become effective until it has been passed by Congress, signed
by the President and judicially ratified by the United States Supreme Court.
The history of the litigation involving section 1 of the Sherman Act is a particularly illuminating example of the application
of this new theory At the time that the Sherman Act was passed,
the doctrine of judicial ratification had not yet been formulated.
So both businessmen and lawyers assumed that there might be
some doubt as to which contracts, combinations or conspiracies
were in restraint of trade but that there could not be any doubt
* Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. B.A.,
LL.B., Umversity of Minnesota.
15 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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that every person who made a contract or engaged in a conspiracy
in restraint of trade was guilty of a misdemeanor-as plainly
stated in the Sherman Act. As a consequence, a good many
unsophisticated businessmen and lawyers determined either to
plead guilty, nolo contendere, or not guilty to charges of violating the Sherman Act solely on the basis of their appraisal of the
evidence as to the alleged violation.
In 1961, an ingenious lawyer, well schooled in contemporary
theories of jurisprudence, realized that the penal provision of section 1 of the Sherman Act had never been ratified by the Supreme
Court. He reasoned from this that it was illegal, and probably
unconstitutional, to indict an individual for violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act. It happens that the particular case m which
this question first arose, United States v. Wise,2 involved a person
who was charged with violating section 1 of the Sherman Act
while acting in his capacity as a corporate officer. However, the
several district court decisions holding section 1 inapplicable to
an individual suggest that the incidental legal problems involved
in acting for a corporation as an officer were of secondary importance with respect to such rulings. After all, the overwhelming
majority of individuals who are, or may be, involved in violation
of the Sherman Act are officers and agents of corporations acting
for their corporations with respect to the matters constituting
restraint of trade.
Fundamentally what disturbed the several district courts
which held that a corporate officer could not be individually
indicted for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act was the
fact that in the more than seventy years from its enactment this
provision of the Sherman Act had never been ratified by the
Supreme Court. As a result, several cases involving an indictment of individual corporate officers under section 1 of the Sherman Act were dismissed by district courts and were appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
On the last decision day of the term, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Wise,' ratified the penal provision of section 1
of the Sherman Act. Consequently it is now clear that "every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination
2 370 U.S. 405 (1962)

SIbid.
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shall be
or conspiracy [in restraint of trade or commerce]
-4 Of course, this is the
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.
very language of the statute as enacted in 1890, and could have
been read in the statute books at any time during the last seventytwo years precisely as I have stated it.5 However, there was
apparently sufficient doubt that it was the law so that a number
of eminent lawyers, and several district judges, believed it could
not be the law until June 25, 1962.
The situation with respect to the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger
Act was similar, although slightly more complex. Prior to 1950,
section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibited the acquisition by one
corporation of the shares of another corporation where the effect
might be to lessen competition between the two corporations involved. The scope of this section was obviously rather limited.
It applied only to mergers achieved through the acquisition of
corporate shares, and it prohibited only the lessening of direct
competition between an acquired and an acquiring corporation.
The Celler-Kefauver Act rewrote section 7 of the Clayton Act to
prohibit, insofar as applicable, the acquisition by one corporation
of either the shares or assets of another corporation, "where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country the effect of such
acqusition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly"
Prior to 1962, the Supreme Court had dispossed of only two
cases involving amended section 7 In Maryland & Virginia Milk
ProducersAs'n v. United States,7 the Court passed upon the clai
by an agricultural cooperative association that it was exempt from
the provisions of that section. That case involved corporations
that were direct competitors and violations of sections 1, 2 and 3
of the Sherman Act. So the ruling of the Supreme Court did
not involve the effect of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment. In
Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States,8 the Court granted a
motion to affirm a district court's judgment entered under section
7 The Court did not write an opinion or pass upon any of the
issues of the case other than to make a brief per curiam notation
4 Id.at 407 n.2.

5See 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §1 (1958).
664 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958).
7362 U.S. 458 (1960).
8365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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of affirmance. So Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,O decidcd
June 25, 1962, was the first case in which the Supreme Court
had occasion to consider the substantive terms of the CellerKefauver Amendment of section 7
The Supreme Court, in the Brown Shoe case, indicated a keen
awareness of its role m establishing the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the statute. After disposing of the technical point of
finality of the judgment for purposes of appellate review, the
Court considered the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver
Act. It said that "the dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy," 0 The Court then went on to discuss the
factors which were considered by Congress in drafting the
amended section 7 and which are therefore relevant to a judgment of the validity of a given merger under the statute. The
Court specifies eight factors.
First, the statutory amendment made plain that prohibited
acquisitions include acquisitions of corporate assets as well as of
corporate stock.
Second, the amendment made plain that the act applies not
only to mergers between actual competitors but also to conglomerate and vertical mergers that may have the proscribed
effects.
Third, the congressional intent was to arrest mergers at a
time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of
commerce was still in its incipiency, rather than to await the full
development of the anticompetitive effect.
Thus the fourth congressional purpose was to erect a standard for judging the legality of business combinations that is less
stringent, in the sense of requiring less extensive proof by the
Government, than the standard applied by courts under the
Sherman Act.
Fifth, Congress intended to reshain mergers only to the extent that such combinations do lessen competition. The Court
noted that this might permit mergers between two small companies that enable the resulting combination to compete more
0 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
30

Id. at 315.
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effectively with larger companies in the industry, or between a
corporation which is financially healthy and a failing one.
Sixth, Congress promulgated no particular test for measuring
the relevant market, either as to its geographical extent or its
product scope; and Congress sought to fix no quantitative or
qualitative definition of substantiality.
Seventh, the amended act permits a functional view of a
merger in the context of its particular industry Thus it is proper
to take into account whether a merger is in a fragmented industry
or in one that is already concentrated or tending toward concentration, whether it is one in a field in which there is easy entry
or in which there are economic barriers to entry, and whether
it is in an industry in which there is ready access to suppliers
and buyers or in which there is existing or threatened foreclosure
of such access.
Finally, the eighth congressional purpose was to indicate a
concern with probabilities not certainties. As the Court's opinion
says, "mergers with a probably anticompetitive effect were to
be proscribed by this Act.""
It should be noted that these eight factors are not eight
separate subjects for inquiry and determination in each merger
case, but rather are prmciples to guide the courts in consideration
of merger cases generally' In considering the specific case presented by Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court did not take these
eight points as separate criteria to be applied to the facts, but
rather set them forth as explication of the principles which did
guide the Court in its approach to the facts of the case. In its
analysis of the case, the Court considers the evidence to determine whether there is an indication of a probable lessening of
competition, first in the vertical aspect, and second in the horizontal aspect of the situation.
The Court begins its consideration by noting that the "area
of effective competition" must be determined by reference to the
line of commerce, or product market, and to a section of the country, or geographic market.ri The Court then goes on to describe
the determination of a product market in these terms:
11 Id. at 323.
12Id. at 324,
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The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and
substitutes for it. However, within this broad market, welldefined submarkets may exist, which, in themselves, constitute markets for antitrust purposes.
The boundaries of such a submarket may be determined by examming such practical mdicia as industry or public recognition
of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to
price changes, and specialized -vendors. Because §7 of the
Clayton Act prohibits any merger which may substantially
lessen competition 'in any line of commerce [emphasis supplied], it is necessary to examine the effects of a merger in
each such economically significant submarket to determine
if there is a reasonable probability that the merge will substantially lessen competition. If such a probability is found
to exist, the merger is proscribed.i1
The Court also notes that "the criteria to be used in determining the appropriate geographic market are essentially similar to
those used to determine the relevant product market.
Moreover, just as a product submarket may have
significance as
the proper 'line of commerce, so may a geographic submarket be
considered the appropriate section of the country -14
It seems to me that there are three important points in this
discussion. First, it is clear that a market is not a single unique
and discreet entity or phenomenon. A single industry and a single
product may have a number of markets and submarkets; different
market boundaries are appropriate to different inquiries or problems, and, indeed, more than one market boundary may be appropriate to a particular problem.
In the second place, the market issue under section 7 is different than the corresponding issue under section 2 of the Sherman
Act, as pointed out by the courts in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v.
FTC, 5 and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 6 When the
market question involves power over price, substitute products
13 Id. at 825.
14 Id. at 336.

296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. dented, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
A 168 F Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15
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may be relevant because they can limit that power. The issue
under section 7 is not whether a merger will give a company
power over price, or enable it to exclude a competitor, but
whether it will substantially lessen competition. As the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit obseivcd, "there can be a substantial lessening of competition with respect to a product whether or not there are reasonably interchangeable substitutes. '
In the third place, the approach suggested by the Supreme
Court does not require that every merger case involve an exhaustive analysis into every conceivably relevant market, submarket and economic element related to any of these. The language of the Brown Shoe opinion does state that because section
7 prohibits any merger which may substantially lessen competition "in any [emphasis supplied] line of commerce" therefore "it
is necessary to examine the effects of a merger m each such-economically significant submarket to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the merger will substantially lessen competition." 8 On casual reading this leaves the impression that the
Court is saying that every market and submarket must be explored in each merger case.

I believe that more careful examination will show that this is
not at all what is intended. Rather the Court is saying that the
legality of a merger cannot be established without first demonstrating that after examining every market and submarket there
is no market in which it is reasonably probable that competition
will be substantially lessened. On the other hand, if there is any
market or submarket in which there is a reasonable probability
of lessening competition, the merger is illegal without reference
to any other market or submarket. In order to pass legal muster,
a merger must meet a series of tests involving examination of
every relevant market and submarket. If it fails any one of these
tests, then the merger is illegal; and it is legal only if it passes
all of the tests. Thus to bar the merger it is necessary only to
show that it has failed to pass the test in one relevant market
or submarket.
This approach is by no means harsh or unreasonable. On the
1 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 1961).
IsBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
894,(1962).
325
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contrary, this approach is precisely the same as that which is
adopted in many other equally significant matters. For example,
if a securities issue is made either as a result of a merger or otherwise, the securities are examined by counsel for the underwriters
and purchasers on precisely a similar basis. A number of successive legal tests are applied to the securities. The issuer must
have been properly incorporated, the securities must have been
properly authorized, the securities must be properly registered
and qualified for sale, the securities must be in proper form, and
many other detailed and specific criteria must be fully satisfied.
If any one of these tests is not met, there will not be a favorable
legal opinion and the securities cannot be marketed. It is only
if all the tests are successfully passed that the securities are valid
and marketable. Similarly, a proposed merger must meet the
test of being free from monopolistic tendency or anticompetitive
effects in every relevant market and submarket. If it fails the test
in any relevant maiket or submarket then it is proscribed by
section 7
This approach differs somewhat from the suggestions of those
who claim that in every merger case the court should examine a
multitude of economic factors, all of which must be weighed and
taken into consideration in order to strike some hypothetical balance between advantages and disadvantages. The difficulty with
the latter approach is that with respect to many, if not most, of
the elements claimed to be relevant, the evidence is not available; there are no known standards of judgment, and the time,
resources and ability of the lawyers and the court are wholly
inadequate for the projected task.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, m the Crown
Zellerbach case, has stated the point well. It said:
[S]ome writers have suggested that the Commission, or
the courts, in inquiring into a claimed violation of §7 should
examine a multitude of so-called relevant economic factors.
As if the average antitrust trial were not sufficiently complicated at best, some of these suggestions to enlarge the
list of relevant factors upon which findings were required
would tend to make a case of this kind so appallingly complicated that any judge might well wonder whether the controversy was really a justiciable one. And it is a bit hard
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to believe that Congress meant that a business concern
contemplating merger must undergo a similar struggle to
find out whether its plans may or may not be carried out.19
In the Brown Shoe case, the Supreme Court sustained the
finding of the district court that there were three relevant lines
of commerce, being respectively, men s shoes, women's shoes, and
children s shoes. On the vertical aspect of the case, the Court
noted that by the merger involved Brown had foreclosed the retail outlets for each of these three lines of commerce from competitors to a substantial degree. The Court said that the trend
toward vertical integration in the industry combined with
Brown s policy of selling its products through the acquired retail
stores seemed likely to foreclose competition from a substantial
share of the market in each of the three lines of commerce.
Although the Court did not indicate any view on this matter,
it appears to me that a foreclosure of competition from a substantial share of the market in any one of the three lines would
have been sufficient to condemn the merger. This is clearly the
view adopted by the Court of Appeals in the Crown Zellerbach
case, in which, significantly, certiorari was denied on the same
day that the Brown Shoe opinion was handed down. The Court
of Appeals says plainly that in order to condemn a merger it is
necessary only to find a "product line which was sufficiently
inclusive to be meaningful in terms of trade realities" 20 in which
there is a substantial lessening of competition. It says that in
the statutory phrase the word entitled to emphasis is "any," in
any line of commerce, and that:
[A]ny line of commerce does not mean the same as the
entire line of commerce, or all lines of commerce engaged
in or touched upon by the acquired concern. The line of
commerce need not even be a large
2 part of the business
of any of the corporations involved. 1
The language of the Court of Appeals in the Crown Zellerbach
case was used with reference to a horizontal lessening of competition. However, it is plain from the Supreme Court opinion in
Brown Shoe that these comments are equally applicable to either
19 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1961).
20Id. at 811.
21 Id. at 812.
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a vertical or horizontal analysis. Thus the Court of Appeals says
that a lessening of competition in ny line of commerce condemns a merger if the "market affected was a distinct and substantial one. ' 22 The Supreme Court says that there must be an
effect on competition generally "in an economically significant
market."23 It then says that the same lines of commerce are appropriate for considering the horizontal aspects of the merger as
were used in analysis of the vertical aspects.
In the Brown Shoe case, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that the relevant geographical market was cities with populations exceeding 10,000 in which both the acquiring and acquired
companies had retail outlets. It said that although the evidence
did not provide a detailed analysis of all cities it did "provide a
fair sampling of all the areas in which the impact of this merger
is to be measured."24 The Court noted that by this merger a large
national retail chain was integrated with a manufacturing operation. It pointed out that the industry had in recent years been
subject to such a trend toward economic concentration. The
merger placed under Browns control about 1,600 retail outlets
or about 7.2 percent of the country s retail shoe stores 25 The
Court then concluded:
We cannot avoid the mandate of Congress that tendencies toward concentration in industry are to be curbed
in their incipiency, particularly when those tendencies are
being accelerated through giant steps striding across a
hundred cities at a time. In the light of the trends in this
industry, we agree with the Government and the courts
below
that this is an appropriate place at winch to call a
halt 2 6
A point that is probably more important than its position in a
footnote might seem to indicate is the Court's explanation of the
significance of a history of tendency toward concentration in an
industry The Court points out that a history of expansion
through merger presents a different economic picture than a history of expansion through unilateral growth. It says:
V21bid.
23
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
241d. at 340.
251d. at 845.
20 Id. at 346.
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Internal expansion is more likely to be the result of mcreased demand for the company s products and is more
likely to provide increased investment in plants, more jobs
and greater output. Conversely, expansion through merger
is more likely to reduce available consumer choice while
providing no increase m industry capacity, jobs or output.
It was for these reasons, among others, Congress expressed
its disapproval of excessive acquisitions. Section 7 was enacted to prevent even 2small mergers that added to concentration in an mdustry.
This is a point which is often quite overlooked by businessmen, lawyers and commentators. There is a vast economic, social
and legal difference between corporate growth and merger, between expansion and acquisition. This distinction must be kept
in mind in any intelligent consideration of the economic, social
and legal problems involved in this field.
In appraising the significance of the Brown Shoe case, I am
let back to my starting point. The Celler-Kefauver Amendment
to section 7 of the Clayton Act has now been made effective by
judicial ratification. The Supreme Court has said that the Act
means exactly what it says, and that it says what Congress clearly
intended to say when the Act was under consideration.
"To me § 7 is definite and clear. It prohibits acquisitions,
either of stock or assets, where competition in any line of commerce in any section of the country may be substantially lessened.
The test as stated in the Senate Report on the bill is whether there
28
is a reasonable probability that competition may be lessened."
These are the words of Justic Clark in his concurring opinion and
they express my own view as well as it can be stated.
Of course there will be problems in the application of this
statute to the complex situations that are within its scope. However, let us hope that Congress and the Supreme Court both having spoken, the bench and bar will now recognize that the act
does mean what it says. The act was intended to be a practical
working rule and not merely a starting point for a series of protracted and virtually unlimited inquiries into economic theory
and practice. The dominant congressional purpose in the 1950
amendment of section 7 was to arrest the increase in economic
27 Id. at
28 Id. at

345.

355.
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concentration in the American economy Any merger which substantially contributes to such an increase in any significant market or submarket is prohibited by the statute. If such an increase
is disclosed by the evidence, there is no occasion for examining
or exploring all of the other economic consequences of the merger,
for these are then irrelevant.
With the demarcation and emphasis thus given to the 1950
Anti-Merger Act, we may now have a practicable and comprehensible legal rule applicable to corporate mergers that will at
once permit those which do not lessen competition, forbid those
that may lessen competition or tend toward monopoly, and,
above all, enable us to distinguish between them within the
period allowed by the Rule Against Perpetuities.

